Many concession contracts contain a provision for arbitration. Reference is sometimes made to International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration (which is preferred by most lenders) or to a local arbitration institution. Often, the agreement presents a special procedure. Arbitration is often a preferred option in the event of a conflict between the parties. The reference clauses in Box 52 are intended to decide to increase the concession fee if the parties do not reach an agreement. This type of conciliation may also apply to other disputes that may arise during the concession period. Example 7: Sub-Saharan Africa: Ifrikya Railway Concession – a case study by Karim-Jacques Budin, SSATP Working Paper No. 64, World Bank, 2003 (English and French) – The case study contains a model railway concession agreement (section 3) that was designed for a sub-Saharan African state. That standard contract shall provide that the use of the railway infrastructure operated by the concessionaire may be open to other railway undertakings in the circumstances referred to in Article 6 of the concession contract. Use by third parties would be based on specific track access agreements between the concessionaire and the operator concerned, for which an infrastructure charge is levied. A common area for concession agreements between governments and private companies involves the right to use certain parts of public infrastructure, such as railways.B. Rights can be granted to individual companies – which creates exclusive rights – or to several organizations.
As part of the agreement, the government may have construction and maintenance rules as well as current operational standards. Agreement: the concession agreement between the port authority [port or land] and the operator, to whom this roadmap belongs, including all timetables, and how it may be amended, amended or amended from time to time. Concession contracts are essential for infrastructure development in the country. WABs have been very useful in simplifying concession agreements. It has reduced the delays and costs associated with the implementation of such agreements. However, the excessive rigidity of the MWC structure harms the interests of private companies and prevents them from investing in the infrastructure sector. Efforts should be made to allay fears about the misallocation of risks and to allow for a renegotiation of concession agreements, in line with the recommendations of the Kelkar Committee report. . . .